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COMMENTARY 
The Impact of the Employment Contracts Act on Labour 
Law: Implications for Unions 
Walter Grills* 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 (the E~CA or the Act) is only one of a number of 
fundamental changes to the basis upon which N~ew Zealand society has recently been 
required to operate. These changes have been thrust upon New Zealanders by successiv~e 
governments. The response of the people to such forced feeding has been to change the 
very basis of how governments are to be el~ected and are to operate. The public complaint 
is not only with the fast pace of unanticipated and undesired ~change. The complaint is 
more with the failure of politicians once elected to carry out policy announced in the 
process of electioneering. 
However, one ~example of an election promise fulfilled, and a fundamental change force fed, 
is the Employment Contracts Act. The ECA is not only about the efficiency of the labour 
market, but the accountability of employees to their employers. The fundamentals of the 
Act were set out in the National Party's election manifesto. The National Party won the 
1990 election by a substantial majority. Pat Walsh and Rose Ryan describe the speed and 
detennination of the Government as follows: 
On 9 November, still less than a fortnight after the ~election, the Minist~er of Labour sent a 
• 
paper to the Cabinet meeting of 12 November seeking authorisation for legislation to repeal 
exclusive membership and negotiating coverage for registered unions, to introduce voluntary 
unionism, to allow employers and employees to 'freely determine their own arrangements 
for establishing, conducting, settling and enfor,cing the outcome of negotiations', and to 
ensure that collective settlements had the status of binding contracts enforceable in a court 
of law. (Harbridge, 1993: 18) 
The change to the law effected by the ECA was both abrupt and radical. The question 
which this paper addresses is, "What is the impact of the ECA on labour law?" The short 
answer to the question may be given in one sentence. The primary impact of the ECA on 
labour law is to abolish the legal status accorded to the trade union movement for the 
previous 97 years . 
• Walter Grills is an Adjudicator and Mediator Member of the Employment Tribunal in Dunedin. The views 
expressed are the personal views of the author. He is grateful to Bronwen Morris, Susan McBride and Dianne 
Marsh for assistance in the preparation of the paper, and to Ian McAndrew for editorial comments. An earlier 
version of the paper was presented to a seminar on Employment Law sponsored by the New Zealand Institute 
of Industrial Relations Research in October, 1993. 
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The Couneil of Trade Unioas: itll 
The new law impinges not only upon the 
central organisation of •mions. • aad 
represented through cenb·al wbich 
recently these organisations have joined toaet• 
Unions (CTU). · labour had 
with the goveJttDJent, the cenl&al 
Services Commission. Successive go¥ 
the central organisation of entployces. Both the :Labca' IIIII 
took a tri-partite approach which involved the •mion 
in the of the economy. 
The policy of the previous Natioaal Oova:nment 
of Labour. In 1984 ag• ccn1ent was widl tb8 
of significant refot•ns to the wage fixiDg systen1. Oae .a.. 
partite conferences to be held prior tethe 
initial purpose of the conference was for the govcrlllllmt tD 
the economy, and for the parties to slate their wewa ... 
bargaining within the wage round. The poaitiea ef 1llo 
considered not only in respect to wages, but to 
guidelines, or the appropriateness of such guidelines, 
ag• eed upon. The conferences allowed the to 1Bit dDwa 
the employers to cry poverty, and the union moveaa1 PI lie 
membership as a major player in the ef the 
conference failed to achieve its own at llllt -. 
perspective, the tri-partite conference was a good public ~ellltieal 
confines of the tri-partite wage conferern, 
characterised the relations between govet••ments and the c.dllll 
Nevertheless, the Labour govetnment succeeded in 1989, as the 
in 1984, in reaching an accord of sorts with the union 
In December 1989, the CTU reached an ag•ccment, known • 
was to be the outgoing govet••ment in October of the foDowias • 1.1la 
describe the Compact as a political diversion. The 
had stepped down following an embai1assing split with the Niailllr 
tax proposal and the pace forced by the gover&•ment in 
economic refo1nas. The Compact was designed to show a •mitt 
not enjoy. Nevertheless, the Compact was, in principle, 
concerned with consultative processes. Ag~ee•nent was reaaW 
and the CTU on broad principles of consultation both 
government, and between unions and employers at the 
Compact was a bi-partite ag•eement The en1ployers' centlal 
time no longer interested in centralised consultation. 
Compact. The New Zealand Business Roundtable 
Employers Federation (NZEF) had overcome any U&AA~ 
' 
( 
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designing the shape of the National Party's Employment Contracts Bill. By the time of the 
last tri-partite conference in August 1990, the NZEF was critical of the forum, and did not 
see it as appropriate to the decentralised wage fixing system it was now advocating. The 
last tri-partite wage conference was adjourned to await the outcome of the election. 
The adjournment of the tri-partite conference marked the faltering status of the union 
movement. The election in October 1990 resulted in the defeat of the fourth Labour 
government, and signalled the death knell for the ~Compact. Hence, the union movement's 
fall from grace was sudden and the slope w,as steep. On one side of the ~election, the trade 
union movement had sufficient status to be a party to a Compact with the government 
described by the then Prime Minister, Jeffrey Palmer, as "a significant step forward in 
developing new ways for the social partners to work together for a better future." On the 
day before the election, the union movement had a role in which it could potentially affect 
the future social and economic progr~ess of the country. Less than two weeks after the 
election the headlines in The Dominion newspaper announced "PM Hedges On Accord". 
The Government did not commit itself on the ~Compact. It drafted the Employment 
Contracts Bill with the assistance of an employee of the Wellington Employers Association, 
and put the aspects of the Bill which directly affected the union movement into effect 
_ without genuine ~consultation with the unions. Immediately following the election, not only 
was the Compact abandoned, but the labour law as it provided for tri-partite wage fixing 
and the recognition of the central organisation of employees, was abolished. The failure 
of tri-partite provisions of the Labour Relations A~ct 1987 (the LRA) had for some time 
been apparent, and to this extent the abolition of the tri-partite approach was of little 
practical significance to labour law. Nevertheless, it was of major symbolic significance. 
The demise of a century old tradition of centralised wage fixing corresponded with the 
demolition within labour law of the status of the central organisation of trade unions. But 
the statutory bums-rush was directed, not only at the central organisation of the trade union 
movement, but also against its ~constituent membership. 
Disorganising organised labour 
The LRA of 1987 provided for a fonn of compulsory union membership. It r~equired the 
insertion of a standard clause, the unqualified preference clause, in all awards and 
agreements where ~employers and unions agreed to its insertion. The standard clause 
provided that employees were required to join the union within 14 days of being requested 
to do so by the union. If the employer party and the union did not agree, a ballot was 
conducted. The standard clause was not inserted unless a majority of the cov~ered 
employees voting voted in support of its insertion. This arrangement was decided upon 
after a series of legislative experiments with different types of union membership 
provisions. The National government had introduced voluntary unionism effective February 
1984. Voluntary unionism cut deeply into union membership. In 1985 the Labour 
government again changed the legislation. The unqualified prefer~ence provision was 
~equired to be in every award and agreement. And this was again modified by the LRA 
m 1987. As noted, the unqualified preference clause was now to be inserted either by 
agreement or by ballot. 
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The ECA reintroduced voluntary unionisna. In 
require, and unionists cannot behave in a way whiolt ~ 
Voluntary unioniSJn can always be expected to clecBall • 
under the ECA can be expected to be more seveN tlvm iD 1914. 
combines voluntary unionisn• with a number of odu to 1118 
which did not accompany voluntary 1mioni51n as it waa Ia I 
Aeeess to worken 
Under the LRA, the •mion was an original paaty to the award- as a IJodr 
a direct legal interest in the award's adminisbation aad a riPt of te 1lle 
Fo1merly, Labour Department inspectors were charged with awadl. 
LRA the gove~ument bad decided that enforcen1ent should a p.iwa 
role was assigned to union officers aad paid officials. Uai0111 wem 
at reasonable times to interview employees where there 
believing that an award was not being adhered to. The nnioa 8 W 
to investigate wage records and to interview the en1ployer. 
to union officers and paid officials to carry out union busiDeaa, a 
employees become members of the •mion, collectina 
info1anation as to ballots. The LRA also provided for two paiciiiDp 
year. Finally, the LRA stipulated that the employer was to • 
addresses, and work classifications of e•nployces by 
contained substantial advantages for organising a 11nion. we. 
to allow union officials ~ to records for the purpose of -" 
for signing up members. The latter was facilitated by the 
was to provide on a six monthly basis checklists of cw&ent 
could identify potential members . 
Under the ECA the door has been shut in the tmion's face, aad is BOt to 
the employer says so. The Act provides that a · 
place, but only by agaeement of the employer. If the 
cannot approach potential members while they are at wodL 
employees to join the union when they are not at wort 
joining the union could be conveyed to a group of 40 
hour meeting at the workplace. Conveying the ..__., 
from the workplace might take 40 hours. A geneml IDIItiaa 
work hours, but many workers do not want to be ._ • 
It is somewhat analogous to appearing as a wi 
Workers don't mind giving evidence if they are 
as voluntarily testifying against their employer. u.-
"summoned" by compulsory union membership 
employee stood out as anti-employer by virtu8 of 
The ECA does provide a right of access for a dulJ 
to enter the workplace at reasouable times tD 
right of access presupposes, however, tbat the 
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workforce in the first place. In many, if not most ~circumstances, the union is likely to fail 
to initially organise the workforce without access to the workplace. The union suffers the 
decided disadvantage that the employer has, while his employees are at work, a captive 
audience. Where a union had been solidly organised under the LRA, access will be granted 
by virtue of the force of that solidarity. Where the organisation had been loose, and 
employees were union members only because of compulsory unionism, the access 
provisions of the ECA will usually preclude effective union organisation of the workplace. 
The legal status of unions 
The tenn "union" is conspicuously absent from the ECA. The Act is essentially silent as 
to how a union and ,an employer are to treat one another during collective bargaining. 
Section 185 (l) does refer to unions, but only for the purpose of deeming unions which 
were forrnally registe~ed under the Labour Relations Act to be registered under the 
Incorporated Societies Act 1908. The trade union therefore is like any other group of 
persons joined for purposes other than · pecuniary gain, and incorporated under the 
Incorporated Societies Act. However, the absence of the tetm "union" from the Act is more 
than just a political snub or legal slight. Under the LRA, a registered union had automatic 
bargaining rights in respect of ~employees who perfotrned work that fell within the scope 
of the union's membership rules. The union was most often the applicant for a new or 
renewed award, and was therefore an original party to the award. 
Under the ECA a union has no particular status. Its ~egistration under the Incorporated 
Societies Act does not convey bargaining status upon a union. A union must have received 
authority to bargain on behalf of employees from the employees themselves. Hence, the 
union does not have original party status in the ,sense that the union is the initiator of 
negotiations for new or renewed contracts. The "original" parties to an employment 
contract are employers and the employees. Once an individual or collective contract is 
settled, then the representative may be a party to the contract with the consent of the other 
parties. That representative might be a union, or it might be a lawyer or industrial advocate 
or consultant. The advantage to a union and its membership in the union being a party to 
the contract is that the union can enforce the contract, and agree to or veto a variation of 
the contract during its currency. 
On the other hand, a union becoming a party to a contract could potentially become the 
of subject of an action for damages where the ~contract is breached. This may be particularly 
important in the case of an illegal strike, such as a wildcat strike carried out by a small 
sector of workers without the approval of the general membership. Therefore, there may 
be some disadvantage to a union in being a party to a collective contract. In any event a 
union fmding it a necessity to take an enforcement or compliance action during the currency 
of a contract is likely to have negotiated the collective contract with an employer of 
sufficient hostility to refuse to allow the union to be a party to the contract. The experience 
thus far under the ECA has been that there is some-- considerable resistance to unions 
becoming parties to collective contracts. Unions have succeeded in doing so only in 
llis approximately 25 percent of collective contracts (Harbridge, 1993:74). 
tbe 
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Standing before the Employment Court and Tribunal 
A union is an incorporated society for whatever purposes the union's rules stipulate. 
However, the union has only the potential status of a representative under the ECA to 
represent its membership before the Employment Tribunal or Employment Court. 
Registration under the LRA gave the union the automatic right to represent its membership. 
A union's standing before the fottner Mediation Service and Labour Court was seldom 
challenged. No such automatic right to represent its members exists for a union under the 
ECA. Section 59 provides that an employee may choose to be ~epresented in order to 
ex,ercise general rights established under the Act. But it does not automatically follow that 
an employee has given the union authority merely because the person is a member of the 
• 
urn on. 
A set of union rules providing that the union shall be a representative in any or all possible 
legal actions under the ECA may be in conflict with the Act itself. Subsection 59 (3) 
provides that "Any person purporting to represent any employee or employer shall establish 
that person's authority for that representation". This section speaks of employee in the 
singular, and not of employees collectively. The word "that" emphasises the individual 
person and a particular representation. In Ward v ,Christchurch Transport [(1992] l ERNZ 
306), despite an employee signing a general authority for the union to act on behalf of the 
employee, the evidence demonstrated that the particular employee did not want to join other 
employees as an applicant in the particular proceedings. While the possibility ~emains that 
the Court may under certain circumstances accept that a "class action" by one or a relative 
few employees on behalf of a general class of similarly placed employees is appropriate, 
it appears that that will be the exception under the ECA, not the rule. The onus is on the 
union, as representative, to convince the Court of the appropriateness of the approach (see 
United Food etc Union of NZ v Talley [1992] 3 ERNZ 423). 
In Adams v Alliance Textiles ([1992] 1 ERNZ 982) the union sought to have a collective 
contract set aside, but could not convince sufficient union members to give their authority 
to proceed with the case have the collective contract set aside in its entirety. The 
Employment Court considered the merits of the case only insofar as the collective contract 
applied to those who had given authority to the union to run the ,case. The Chief Judge 
emphasised the importance of having clear individual authorities from employees. The 
difficulty from the union point of view is that individual employees do not wish to reveal 
their opposition to an aggressive employer, particularly during times of high unemployment. 
The difficulty for the Tribunal or the Court is that there is no ~evidence either way. On the 
face of the Alliance case, the workers may have been intimidated, or they may simply have 
been happy with the collective contract. 
Unions as bargaining agents 
The idea that the union can act on its own authority is severely limited under the ECA. 
That is because the union must be a party to a collective contract in order to appear before 
the Employment Tribunal or Employment Court on an enforcement matter, and employers 
are reluctant to agree to unions being party to their collective contracts. The limitations 
t 
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also extend to collective bargaining. Section 10 of the Act establishes the right of 
employees to be represented in the negotiation of their employment contracts. Section 12 
pertains specifically to the authority needed by unions and other bargaining agents to 
represent employees in the negotiation of ·employment contacts. Subsection 12 ( 1) requires 
that the representative establish its authority. Ideally, the r·epresentative will have an 
authorization signed by the employee or employees. The significance of the impact of this 
section should not be overlooked. 
Under the LRA, negotiators were nominated by cited parties to an award. The Act did not 
specify nomination procedures, and r·equired the mediator convening the conciliation council 
to simply be satisfied that the nominated negotiators were representativ·e of the industry . 
The practice was that the mediator asked the negotiators if they were representative of the 
industry, and then accepted their assurances that they were. Objections of various kinds 
were occasionally heard. But in the vast majority of award negotiations under the LRA, 
examination of the question of representation was cursory, if not farcical. An award agreed 
upon most obviously bound the cited employer parties and their employees. But the award 
was also binding on .all other employers, known as subsequent parties, and their employees -.._ 
throughout the industry. By virtue of the provisions of the LRA, and the award's coverage 
clause, the award bound all employers in the industry without their consent. The award 
also bound their employees without their consent. The award was negotiated by negotiators 
who simply did not ask for, and were not given the individual authority of employers and 
employees to act on their behalf. 
Subsection 12 ( 1) of the E·CA makes it clear that the law has been r·eversed. The irony of 
the LRA was that negotiators were not required to have direct authority to represent 
individual employees or employers, yet it was a requkement that award negotiators have 
legal authority to reach binding agreements without first ~efening the ~eement back to 
those who were to be bound by it for their approval. Section 16 of the ECA pertains to the 
ratification of settlements where a contract is negotiated by an authorised repr~esentative. 
A ratification procedure must be agreed prior to negotiations, and a settlement must be 
ratified if the agreement is to become a binding employment contract. 
Discriminating against unionists 
The union does not act on its own behalf as a collective or body corporate, but as a 
representative of its members. The union is treated w1der the Act as no more or less than 
a lawyer or industrial advocate. The point is of importance not only because of the 
administrative difficulties involved in obtaining individual authorities for large numbers of 
union members, but also to illustrate that the ECA treats the question of union membership 
as an issue different from that of the union's role as a representative. The right to union 
membership does not mean the same thing as the right to have your union representative 
recognised in the sense of being dealt with fairly or in good faith. An ~employer can 
actively discourage employees use of a representative, and actively encourage the 
employees to abandon their representative. The employer can take up any or all of these 
tactics without being said to unduly influence the employees in respect to union 
membership. 
• 
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Sections 6 and 7 of the ECA establish that men•bs•dp fit 
voluntary, and preference in employment or in fD 
not be based on 1mion membership or non- II II 
analysis reveals in Adams v Allitmce Textiles, while the 
respect to an employee joining or not joining a the 
neutral as to whether the employee tbe • • a 
bargaining. Sections 6 and 7 are about mentbenhip in -- 11181 ' ' ~ i ~ . - . 
They do not prescribe how an employer should of 
Section 8 of the Act may appear at first sight to have more 
refers to the protection of individual 
undue influence directed at encouraging tbem to not act or to 
employees they represent Even so, nowhere in this section it 
approaching the employer's own employees in an to 
a union representative or the continued use of a union 
Union reeognition 
Section 20 (3) of the ECA provides that the eanployer, in 
may negotiate with either the individual employees or any 
employees. Whether the employer deals with · 
representative is over to the eauployees. Section 2l(l)(b) 
collective employment contract, the employer may • with tiiB 
or "(i)f the employees so wish, any authorized of the 
section is reinforced by Section 12 (2), which says that die 
authority of a duly authorised representative of for tile 
an employment contract The section does not · · 
employment contracts, and therefore a must be 
of negotiating either a collective or an individual contract of 
The section does not define the meaning of 
Textiles does provide a definition of what recognition 
does not require. According to the Chief Judge, 
employer negotiate with the union. Nor does it JRVCIIt 
employees directly with the intention of tha• 
authorized representative and negotiate a collective co..., 
The Act, therefore, provides for limited recognition of an 
employees can, under Section 20 (3) (b), insist on the 
representative if the employer wants to bargain over a 
need not continue to pursue a collective contract, .._ 
the parties are free to negotiate "(t)he question of~ 
individual or collective." 
An ernployer may simply refuse in negotiatious to 
employer has to recognise a union representative's 
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contract, but the employer doesn't have to negotiate such a contract. Section 8 of the E~CA 
d<'es not prohibit the employer directly approaching the employees about the advantages to 
them of negotiating directly with the employer and of revoking the authority previously 
given to their representative (or, indeed, the advantages of withholding authority and 
dealing directly with the employer in the frrst place). In short, nothing in the Act requires 
the employer to remain neutral in respect to influencing ~employees attitudes towards 
utilising or not utilising a bargaining representative. The employer, therefore, may at any 
time seek to convince the employee to revoke a bargaining authority, to abandon his or her 
bargaining agent, and to bargain directly with the employer over a collective contract. 
Hence, union recognition can be thwarted by the employer's refusal to negotiate a collective 
contract, or by the employer's persuasion of employees to revoke the union's bargaining 
authority. 
The wording of the ECA simply does not say that the employer must recognise the 
representative in the sense of honourable dealings or negotiations in good faith. To the 
contrary, in A~dams v AUiance Textiles, while initially accepting that the union would be 
party to a collective agreement, the company ultimately encouraged the employees to seek 
alternative advice. The company convinced employees either that the union was not acting 
in their best interests, or that they had no alt~emative but to sign contracts to which the 
union was not a party and of which union officials did not approv~e. The company was 
negotiating at two plants, one at Redruth and the other at Mosgiel. The Court found that 
the company secured agreement with a single delegate at Redruth and ~eed to keep that 
agreement secret. The delegate did not have authority to negotiate on behalf of other 
employees, and the union was not party to the contract which the individual delegate 
signed. The company then announced to the Mosgiel workforce that agreement had been 
reached at Redruth on a contract that excluded the union. Employees then began signing 
up at both plants and the union was defeated. On the significance of the requirement to 
recognise a bargaining agent, Chief Judge Goddard of the Employment Court had this to 
say in Adams v Alliance Textiles: 
It is dear that the respondents did ~ecognise the authority of the union to represent the 
applicants. So much so that they require the applicants to withdraw their appointment of 
the union as their representative as a condition of signing the contract personally. The 
~contract referfed to is the contract which excluded the union as a party. 
However, the judgement of the Employment Court in Adams vs Alliance Textiles was 
appealed. The Court of Appeal heard the case, but declined to decide the issues raised on 
the grounds that the issues were no longer alive. Nonetheless, in reaching this conclusion, 
the Court made a number of instructive comments which are of persuasive rather than 
precedential force. The Court expressed reservations about one aspect of the Employment 
Court decision. That aspect related to union recognition. The President of the Court of 
Appeal said: 
As I understand the relevant passage in the judgement of Chief Judge Goddard reported in 
[1992] I E .. R.N.Z. at 1023-4, the proposition is that even while· a union's representative 
authority is in force the employer may approach the emplo) ees directly, provided only that 
undue influence is not used. I do not think it could be safely assumed that this is conect. 
But as ~~ question does not require determination in this case it is better not to express a 
final opanton and to sound a note of warning only. 
-
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The P1esident's statement opens, rather than i 
future litigants are likely to walk in search of......._ 
directly" mean? The union may have authority to act 11 a 
the negotiation of a collective but as 
does not require employer neutrality. The 
Clearly, an employee bas a right to insist that the 
But in the reality of many employment 
because of an imbalance of power. The e11tployee's ~to 
with a union · may be more apparent reaL 
On the other band, the Appeal Court's signal may suggest a 
be willing to at least partially, a topic upon wJaich the 
remains largely silent, namely wbat are fair aad 
employers and employee ves, lllOit 
known, these are directly in North 
like the ECA, is founded on the concept of the 1 Ill 
provisions of the ECA are silent in to Jabov 
of employer and e•nployee relations may require the Bmployllllllt 
issues within its equity and good conscience jurisdictiOD. This is, at~ 
of the writer's speculation. 
Harsh and opp conduct 
Amongst other things, the •mion in " 
collective contract was obtained by harsh aad 
was itself harsh and ·ve. Section 57 of the BCA II 
prohibits two things. First, the section is directed 
behaviour, or undue influence or duress to obtain an 
here is not whether the substance of the contract is hank 
behaviour used to obtain the contract is _ 
in a harsh and oppressive way, even though the conhaat 
oppressive. Section 57 ( 4) empowen the ~mt ~ft .... 
or in part, a contract so obtained. 
The second question is whether the contract itself is 
is perhaps likely to have been obtained by harsh aacl 
the potential holds that a contract may be harsh and 
means which the Court does not consider to be ha•sh 
duress. Again, the Court is ernpowered to set aside, 
oppressive contract. In setting aside a contract 1.1lldiR 
empowered to award compensation to the agg•ieved 
The questions then are what constitutes a banh 
constitutes harsh and oppressive behaviour or 
in Adams v Alliance Textiles, the Chief Judp 
of 
... to 
n. CODti8CJt ...... 11180 -- to the of 
Overtime ad ,..tty ,... cui. Tab lwne pay for tile 
iD tile were The evic1eace 
w.e able to maintain or evea 
was by the employer. 
for the MW was economic. The contract was, in the 
to viability of the 1be 
of the coub-=t divided the workfon:e. woJkers could or 
Oahu wo1brs lost ground. While the Chief identified the 
COD1r8ctl wbich · · the · of Nnployecs 
, by · of that reduction, ha•sh aad · conbaet•. 1be ECA 
ltd, tile preamble to whidl its chief purpoae as the promotion of an efficient 
1be adjvst•nou of aad couditions upwards aad downwards is, 
to the the BCA, · to the survival of the 
audits 
1987 LRA was to protect wages aad conditioas. That bad been 
for labour lesislation for the previous 100 years, aad many are conditioned to 
m take home pay to be harsh aad oppressive. But under the ECA, 
downward will not automatically render a contract hanh aad 
where the o••ployer can show tbat the bona fide intent of the 
is to the · viability of the company in a plXIuct or ---------
• • . ........... .......__ . . . I -.:a.......L.- the d . . --~-
• a coa•tpdil•w ~· aJS queatioD 11 '"''P y ~ •et•on was ...-.; 
JaP8III of labour • .. to • the s •• in the 
dlatisa of tbat oaa· a• mt•to 
was e•1»1oitive. Sed ion 57 of the BCA will not prokft wages aad conditiODS 
llila 111 daced neept in the C8lle tbe contmct is 11111 as exploitive in dae 
be lit if an - ia a 
ef till& palitioa to the COIIIraat. 
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into with lawyers, doctors, accountants, and otber 
and it is over to a plaintiff or applicant to establilll 
if that relationship is not one which bas been 
v Alliance Textiles, Chief Judge Goddard 
between an employer and its employees. However, 6e 
the case, Judges Palmer and Colgan, Their 
relationship should not be added to the list which js 
In their view each employment relationship must be 
facts, on a case by case basis. In the final aalysis, the Ja1ae 
union had not, in any event, shown that Alliance ~ bad ..._ 
relationship in procuring the new contract. 
A word of warning should be noted. In the event that the Court a•rllldee 
special relationship exists, a critical issue ~ tile 
independent advice in to entel ing into the 
more obvious importance in respect to the relationship 
client. If the solicitor and the client enter into a widwat till.._. 
from a second and independent solicitor, then a presu•nption is that 
could have taken advantage of the client because of the client's lack of both 
and independent advice about the law. 
In the relationship between employer and employee, there is otlea a .a-
employer's greater knowledge of labour law. There may be · w.l8e it 
that the employer is in a special relationship to the The 
supe1 ior position in regards to knowledge to dae 
effects of the contract, and that knowledge imparts the JX"'W whiah t p1 
may be subject to the mgnment that the employer bas ex.a..t a I• 
employee where the employee has relied on the e•nployer's advice Ia 
contract which significantly disadvantages the employee. In 6A.,. 
employer sponsored and financially supported an alte1native 
known as the Mosgiel Independent Thought Society (MITS). An 
employees organisation is not a source of advice which could be coasiclered 
where the issue of undue influence is raised. 
Economic duress 
The next question addressed in Adams v Alliance Teztilu 
been secured through harsh and oppressive behaviour or clUNIL 
behaviour the Chief Judge said: 
The behaviour complained of must strike the CoiDt • 
blameworthy and as meting out intolerable It wiD ......U, 
deliberation and unwarranted severity. Deceptive or mis._., 
alleged and agga essive marketing by sbUng p01 SODalities do not 
the behaviour described in the subsection. 
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The Chief Judge then went on to consider the question of duress. The Court decided that 
Alliance Textiles had threatened a legal lockout, and at one stage had legally locked out its 
employees. Without question, duress arises where one party to a contract illegal_ly acts to 
coerce the second party to enter into the contract. However, the ECA estabhshes that 
strikes and lockouts intended to secure a new collective contract are legal. Section 68 of 
the Act provides as follows: 
Where any proceedings under this Act relat·e to the participation of the defendant in a strike 
or lockout (being proceedings alleging a breach of contract on the part of the defendant or 
seeking the imposition of a penalty under this Act), the Tribunal or the Court shall dismiss 
that action or those proceedings if it is satisfied that the participation in the strike or lockout 
was lawful under section 64 of this Act. 
The tenn "any" emphasises that any, if not all, proceedings ·will be dismissed if they relate 
to a lawful strike or lockout. Clearly an unlawful strike or lockout may qualify as 
economic duress, but the law establishes that economic pressure by way of strike or lockout 
is legitimate, even where the strike or lock~ut has dire social and economic consequences 
for those struck or locked out, and where the strike or lockout removes all practical options 
except consent to the tetnts insisted on by the initiator of the strike or lockout. 
Effectiveness of lockouts under tbe ECA 
In a pamphlet widely distributed to N·ew Zealand households, the government essentially 
guaranteed that, under the ECA, wages could not be reduced by unilateral decision or action 
of an employer. The basis of this undertaking was the belief that workers were protected 
by provisions of the ECA which provided that, upon the ·expiry of a collective contract, 
employees are deemed to be on individual contracts based upon the expired collective 
contract. Further, the A·ct legalises strikes and loc~outs in r·espect only to collective, and 
not individual contracts. The government's undertaking seemed initially to be supported 
in a number of early court cases under the ECA. Eventually, however, a loophole emerged. 
If an employer seeks to negotiate a collective c-ontract, then the ·employer may lock out 
employees in an effort to procur·e that collective contract. A collective contract is a contract 
applying to two or more employees. As an example, an employer might seek to renew a 
collective ·contract which has expired. The employees .are on individual contracts under the 
tenns of the expired collective contract. The employer has the right to lock out the 
workers. A second circumstance might involve a small employer with two employees who 
have never been covered by a collective ·Contract. The employer may seek negotiations 
with these employees for a collective contract, and if necessary lock them out. Under either 
scenario, the employer may approach the employees and commence negotiations for a new 
collective contract. In either case the employer may legally lock out the employees. While 
the tettns and conditions of their individual contracts may be retained by employees who 
successfully resist a lockout, the resources of the individual employee are seldom such that 
resistance can be sustained indefinitely. · 
The effectiveness of the lockout is greatly enhanced by the Court's interpretation given in 
Paul and Ors v New Zealand Society for the lntellectual/y Handicapped Incorporated 
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([1992] 1 ERNZ 65). In this caae tile e .,.,_ 
The Court ruled tbat despite the · 
employer could maintain day to day 
than those provided in the 
involve locking the doors to keep e••ployees 
the business in order to force to 
contract. P1essure was appHed to 
conditions of their individual coBb acts (buill 
sought to exclude ftom the new collective cmatM. 
While there were outcries to the effect tbat the Colat's 
a tactic was unfair, those who cry out overlook the fad daa& 
counterpart to the employers' "partial lockout". 'l1l8 
wages are paid in full but the e•nployer's output is 
the total strike or lockout all profits 
counterbalanced by the fact tbat all wages cea• oa till 
and go slows are iniquitous insofar as they ~ 
parties. Nevertheless, both weapons are part of a 
participate in a system which is now tmd• S. 
power rather than equity. 
Utilisation of non-union employees 
The partial lockout was initially identified by 
fact the law relating to lockouts was not 
lockout were available in the f01•ns 
the lockout may be more effective •meter tile BCA. 
Under the ECA the employer can replace lackecl 
workers, who may be either non-union or 
Whether locked out or sbildng workers could be 
a lawful strike is a question in tbe 
the dismissals could be justified under the 
question. 
The demotion of an employee with 
and refused to sign an aot to ~ 
justified in Parish v Capital New8JHIIM1J ~ 
participates in a strike bas clearly inclica1Dd a 
collective contract. Such an indicatiou is 
hand, strikes over collective contract 
fo1n1 of repudiation? If it does • 
bargaining imbalance stems in part filii 
unemployment, the employee is tmlftely 
employee is often easily replaced. 
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The utilisation of non-union labour or labour from competing unions not only enhances the 
effectiveness of the lockout, it also undennines the effectiveness of the strike. In Unkov.ich 
v Air New Zealand Limited ([1993) 1 ERNZ 526), the employer made 159 employees 
redundant. The employees were ·employed in the employer's catering section which was 
experiencing increased ·competition at the Auckland air tettninal. The employees were 
replaced by independent contractors. Unkovich had initially argued that these were not 
independent contractors, but in effect ~employees of Air New Zealand. The argument did 
not succeed. The dismissal of the employees was held to be substantively justified, 
although Air New Zealand failed to handle the dismissals in a procedurally fair .manner. 
The case illustrates that employees may be undercut by independent contractors who 
provide inferior wages and ·conditions for their own employees. The use of redundancy 
thus becomes another weapon in the bargaining armoury of the ~employer. Either wages and 
conditions will be r·educed, or workers will be made redundant and replaced by contractors. 
The w~eapon is enhanced under the ECA because the ~competing independent contractors can 
utilise cheaper non-union labour. 
Marketing the trade union 
What Adams v Alliance Textiles confinns is that the ECA allows for a battle over the hearts 
and minds of employees. The ECA does not requir~e employer neutrality in respect to the 
employees' decision as to whether a union is to be authorised as their repr~esentative. A 
widi.!ange of tactics may be used by the employer to influence the decision, including the 
sponsorship of alternative employee organisations. The employer is prohibited from 
exercising undue influence against an employee's decision to join and remain in a trade 
union. On the other hand there appears to be little prohibition against the employer taking 
actions which render the union ineffective in its representation of the employee in 
bargaining over a ~collective contract. The employee is protected if he or she decides to join 
the union, but the union may be rendered so ineffective that there is no reason to join . 
. 
The personal grievance procedures are one aspect of the ECA cl~early designed on the basis 
of equity rather than the effi.cient operation of the labour market. The procedures 
themselves are in large measure the same as those under the LRA. The ·critical changes 
have been the extension of coverage to all ~employees throughout the country, and the 
provision of adjudication, generally after ·mediation, as the last avenue for disposing of a 
• gnevance. 
Adjudication is a relatively fonnal legal process. As a consequence, a significant majority 
of parties who appear before the Employment Tribunal are now represented by lawyers or 
industrial consultants. Under the ECA, the unions have lost significant ground in terrns of 
representing employees in personal grievance proceedings. Under the LRA union 
membership was a required condition for access to the personal grievance procedures. It 
was a significant reason for joining a union. Under the ECA, not only has the statutory 
support for the union as a representative in collective bargaining· been abolished, but the one 
unique service unions provided their membership - personal grievance representation - has 
been let out to tender. Marketing the trade union in the market economy is not a task 
assisted by the ECA. 
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Conclusion 
The history of 
punctuated widl ftu.l 
destruction of 
for regulating •Jnfair ~ 
United States law, iai1ially 
was characterisld by tile .._ 
to haunt the ECA. 11Ua IIIII 
Zealand, but we 8Ce"' inteat on 
in America. 1be ~ 
status of trade unio111, to abQiiab till 
bargaining agent in collecKive 
representative of in 
The tetnts of reference for this papa were to 
The changes in the law have a 
t,.~ -~ .. __... •• 
. . ' ' 
beyond the scope of indusbial relatiODS. B1lt tile 
suffering significantly under the Act 
However, if the Employmmt Conbids Act 
emphasis on indivicbtal 1 a• her than 
further, probably IOIIel 
Trade union fortunes may again rest on the 
but a political restructuring is 1llltikely fB 
achieved by employers with the b • · d: of 
system of industry wide awards, aad there will Mt 
The union is now an incorporated society, 8lld jail 
itself floating belly up in the pkce. 
turning. New Zealand with its reHance on a 
strategically placed to take advantage of the 
expected that the rugged and robust 
representatives will be reciprocated in the 
compatriots retmn to the union fold. "UncbJe 
the exercise of "due" influence by "''IP~ 
employees have been remarkably inveDtive ia 
Where there is wealth to be shared witll 
Employees in sbategically placed 
Their employers will become ''born 
will be keen to once again intervene. The 
arbitration or unionism. The desire wW W 
outcomes between unions and emDIO 
unions and employers relate to one anotiJar, 
~ ,. 
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market place. However, the Government will have been elected under the MMP electoral 
system, and the problem will not be fixed as in the past by the overnight dash of the 
legislative draftsmen's pen. The industrially vulnerable - wealthy employers, and 
employees not strategically placed within the economy - will be odd fellows waiting 
together for a legislative train which may be some time in arriving. 
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Australia's Trade Union Tnining Authority (TUTA) bu reJeued a 
publication on enterprise bargaining titled "Issues in Workpt.ce 
Bargaining". 
According to the publishers, it is the most comprehensive and easy-to-reM 
analysis of enterprise bargaining available and, in the words of AC1U 
President Martin Ferguson who contributed the publication's foreword, it 
will make a "substantial contribution" to the debate on the subject 
"Issues" explains how enterprise bargaining developed, how it works, 
what agreements should cover and how to make agreements work. 
Issues has a recommended retail price of A$50 and is available by mail 
order from TUTA's head office (PO Box 12365, A'Beckett Sheet, 
Melbourne 3000). 
